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Abstract: This article estimates the proportion of grain "diverted" from the Public 
Distribution System (PDS) to the open market for several years in the past decade, by 
matching state offtake figures published by the government, with household purchase 
reported by the National Sample Survey (NSS). The limitations of this methodology are 
discussed, and alternative estimates are presented to crosscheck estimates obtained by using 
the conventional method. Though the alternative estimates are not very different, the 
discussion here indicates that estimates of diversion must be treated as an upper-bound. At 
the all-India level diversion of grain remains a serious issue, however, state-level trends 
reveal interesting contrasts. Based on contrasting trends in monthly PDS purchase (per 
capita) and estimated diversion, states are categorized into three groups - "functioning", 
"reforming" and "languishing" states. The paper also discusses possible reasons for the 
improvement in the PDS in the reforming states. 
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In most debates around the Public Distribution System (PDS), the large-scale "diversion" of 
grain has been a major cause of concern. Diversion (or, "leakage") from the PDS has been 
estimated periodically (Government of India 2002 and 2005a, Jha and Ramaswami 2010, 
Khera 2011, Himanshu and Sen 2011, among others). In these estimates, diversion refers to 
the proportion of grain that does not reach beneficiary households.
1 While there could be 
several causes for these losses (e.g., during transportation or due to poor storage), the general 
practice has been to attribute all such losses to the illegal sale of PDS grain, meant for ration 
card holders, on the open market. In this paper, the conventional interpretation of diversion is 
adhered to, as there are no reliable estimates of losses due to other reasons. 
 
The main purpose of this paper is one, to discuss the methodological issues involved in 
undertaking such an exercise and two, to look at the level and trend in state-wise diversion of 
PDS grain in India over the past decade. The paper attempts to present an authentic and 
nuanced picture of the state of the PDS, as gauged by diversion rates.
2 The prevailing 
confusion on the performance of the PDS has, in recent months, led to the portrayal of the 
PDS as uniformly defunct. Such a portrayal, in turn, has been used to make a case for junking 
it and replacing it with "cash transfers" (see Basu 2011: p. 44, Bardhan 2011 among others). 
I, however, find that there are divergent trends across states in so far as per capita PDS 
purchase of wheat and rice and proportion of grain diverted are concerned. The estimates 
here suggest that the states can be grouped into three broad categories: in a handful of states, 
diversion of grain is not a major concern ("functioning" states). In others, high levels of 
diversion has been accompanied in recent years by a reduction in diversion ("reforming" 
states). In yet others, the situation remains grim where levels of diversion are high with no 
improvement over time ("languishing" states). PDS reforms that are on the anvil need draw 
upon the experience of the first two sets of states that manage to run a functional and non-
leaky PDS.   
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1 Government of India (2005a) defines diversion differently from the definition used here and in the other 
studies referred to above. 
2 In a recent paper, Bardhan (2011) claims, with respect to the PDS, that "a rough estimate is that less than a 
quarter of the subsidised foodgrains reaches the poor". Similar instances of incorrect guesses or "guessitmates" 
are not uncommon. 
  2In this short paper, I present estimates of diversion for the following years: 1999-2000, 2001-
2, 2004-5, 2006-7 and 2007-8. Though the targeted PDS (or, TPDS) was introduced in India 
in 1997, in effect, the subsidy for households deemed above poverty line (APL) ended only in 
2000-2001.
3 Thus, though each of the years for which I calculate diversion is, strictly 
speaking,  from the post-TPDS period, it can be used to say something, however qualified, 
about the formal transition to a targeted PDS on diversion.
4 One could think of the figures 
from the 55th round of the NSS (pertaining to 1999-2000) as the pre-TPDS figures and those 
from subsequent years as diversion under the TPDS. The state-level variations in food policy, 
especially since 2006, are another reason why the choice of years is of interest. It allows us to 
look at whether the divergent patterns in leakages across states (referred to above), have 
anything to do with state policy (be it the proportion of households covered by the TPDS, or 
the difference between market and PDS price of grain or something else.)  
 
I start with a discussion of the data and methodology. I then present the trends at the state 
level in per capita PDS purchase of wheat and rice for the relevant years and trends in 
diversion. Diversion figures are presented for wheat and rice separately, for each of the major 
Indian states and at the all India level for different points of time in the past 10 years. This is 
followed by a detailed discussion of the methodological caveats. In the concluding section, 
possible explanations for the observed trends and divergence across states, including some 
state-level initiatives in the PDS, are discussed. 
 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
 
As mentioned above, I estimate the proportion of grain diverted at the all India and state level 
over the past decade. "Diversion" estimates presented in this paper include leakages due to 
corruption, transport losses, losses due to spoilage and so on. Another possible reason that 
these estimates may provide the upper limit on diversion is discussed in Section 4.1 below.  




The analysis here roughly covers the past decade, including two "thick" rounds of the NSS, 
55th round (1999-2000) and 61st round (2004-5), and three "thin" rounds 57th (2001-2), 63rd 
(2006-7) and 64th (2007-8). The 64th round pertaining to 2007-8 is the latest round for which 
data are available from the NSS. Even though the data from the 63rd round and 64th round, 
pertaining to 2006-7 and 2007-8 are from thin rounds, it is possible to generate reliable 
estimates at the state-level. 
 
The proportion of PDS grain that is diverted from the system can be estimated by combining 
data on "offtake" by state governments from the Food Corporation of India (FCI) with data 
on household purchase from PDS shops, collected by the NSS. "Offtake" refers to the amount 
of grain that the states take from the FCI for distribution through the PDS. These data are 
                                                 
3 Issue price for APL households has not been revised since 2000-1, and since market prices have risen in the 
meantime, in practice even APL households receive subsidized today. 
4 Note that even though the PDS was, in principle, universal until 1992, in practice it was universal only in 
Kerala. See for instance, the discussion in Howes and Jha (1992 and 1994), Dev and Suryanarayan (1991). Note 
that, data from 1999-2000 (i.e., the 55th round of the NSS) was mired in controversies due to the recall period. 
5 On the other hand, PDS grain might be of poor quality, in the sense that the grain is not cleaned. This could 
lead to an under-estimation of diversion. However, recent field evidence suggests that quality of PDS grain is 
not a major concern. For instance, according to IHDS data, only one percent of households reported poor quality 
being the reason for not using their ration card.  
  3available from the Department of Food and Civil Supplies which publishes monthly data 
(state-wise, for rice and wheat separately) in the "Monthly Foodgrains Bulletin".  
 
On the other hand, the NSS collects data on monthly purchase of rice and wheat from the 
PDS as part of its consumer expenditure surveys. This can be aggregated up, to the state 
level, by multiplying per capita per month purchase by total population for the relevant year.  
The Census of India publishes projected population which can be used for scaling up per 
capita purchases to the state level. 
 
I aggregate the data on monthly offtake from FCI to match the period of the NSS surveys (i.e. 
from July to June).
6 The difference between offtake and total purchase gives an estimate of 
the amount of grain that is diverted.   
 
 
3. Purchase and Diversion of PDS grain 
 
As the level and trend in per capita purchase of grain is of as much interest as diversion, this 
section begins with a discussion on purchase. 
  
3.1 Per capita purchase of rice and wheat from the PDS 
 
Tables 1A and 1B report the per capita purchase of wheat and rice for rural and urban areas 
separately for each of the relevant years. For rural areas, two points are worth noting: first, 
average per capita purchase of grain is quite low: in the case of rice, it is approximately 1kg 
per month and even lower (less than 500 grams) in the case of wheat. Second, there is a lot of 
variation in the state-wise trends in purchase of wheat and rice over the reference period.  
 
Based on per capita purchase of PDS grain, three groupings of states are possible. Before 
discussing these categories, it is worth bearing in mind that between 1999-2000 and 2001-2, 
PDS entitlements were increased from 20kg/month/household to 35kg/month to household. 
After remaining steady for a few years, some states reduced per household entitlements from 
2007 onwards. Some of these changes are tracked in Table 7. 
 
The first category is that of "languishing" states (see Figures 1 and 1A). Roughly these are 
states where per capita purchases have remained below 1kg/month. This group comprises of 
several north Indian states (Haryana, Punjab, Rajasthan) and the east (Assam, Bihar, 
Jharkhand and West Bengal). Surprisingly, it also includes the state of Gujarat, which is the 
only state where there has been a monotonic decline in per capita purchase of PDS grain over 
the past decade. 
 
The second group, see Figures 1 and 1B, is that of "reforming" states where per capita 
purchases were roughly 1kg/month at the beginning of the period being studied, but has risen 
since then. This is a mixed group comprising of Orissa in the east, Chhattisgarh and Madhya 
Pradesh in central India, Uttarakhand and Uttar Pradesh in the north. Note however, that in 
the case of Uttar Pradesh the signs of reform are only barely perceptible - average purchase 
has risen from 0.29kg/month/capita, at the beginning of the period, to 1.02kg/month/capita in 
2007-8 (see Tables 1A and 1B). The most remarkable improvement is in Chhattisgarh where 
                                                 
6 I also try introducing lags between the offtake and purchase, but that does not affect the main results, so those 
tables are not reported here. 
  4per capita purchase in 2007-8 was 3.2kg/month, making Chhattisgarh's PDS among the top 
five in the country (after Himachal, Tamil Nadu, Jammu and Kashmir and Andhra Pradesh). 
 
Those states where per capita purchase of PDS grain has been greater than 1kg/month 
throughout the period under study and has improved over time have been labelled 
"functioning" states (see Figures 1 and 1C). These include all four southern (Andhra Pradesh, 
Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu) and Maharashtra. Besides this, this category includes two 
from the mountainous north (Jammu and Kashmir and Himachal Pradesh). Note that the 
"functioning" states are primarily rice-consuming states. 
 
The trend of per capita PDS purchase emerging from Kerala requires further comment. 
Average purchase of rice crashes from 4.1kg/capita in 1999-2000 (the highest across states in 
that year) to 1.71kg/capita in 2004-5, and then recovers partially in subsequent years to 
2.24kg/capita at the end of the reference period. This is, however, lower than the highest 
reported purchase for 2007-8 from Tamil Nadu (4.84kg/capita).
7 
 
In general, the PDS seems to deliver more in rice-consuming states. As far as wheat is 
concerned (see Table 1B), per capita purchases remained low throughout the reference period 
(between 300-400 grams per capita). The only exception is Himachal which has been doing 
well both in terms of level and trend. Average purchase rose from 1.27kg/capita in 1999-
2000) to 2.46kg/capita in 2007-8. 
 
Average per capita purchase in urban areas is nearly half of the corresponding figures for 
rural areas (0.69kg/capita for rice and 0.21kg/capita for wheat). In urban areas, the same (as 
in rural areas) rice states do well: Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu 
and Kashmir and Chhattisgarh. In the case of wheat, only Himachal Pradesh crosses the 
1kg/capita barrier (average purchase of wheat in urban Himachal was 2.01kg/capita). 
 
3.2 Diversion of rice and wheat 
 
Table 2 reports the estimated proportions of wheat and rice that were diverted for two "thick" 
NSS rounds (the 55th round, 1999-2000 and the 61st round, 2004-5) and three "thin" rounds 
(2000-1, 2006-7 and 2007-8). Three major caveats - under-recording of PDS purchase, choice 
of multipliers and accounting practices - are discussed in the next section. This section 
discusses the main trends in diversion rates. 
 
First, the level of diversion of rice is lower than wheat in each of the years. In 1999-2000, 
about one-tenth of the rice was diverted, whereas nearly half (49%) of all wheat was diverted. 
However, the proportion of rice that is diverted has been increasing rapidly - from just 9.9% 
in 1999-2000 to 18.2% in 2001-2 and to 41.3% in 2004-5. Since 2004-5, there has been a 
marginal decline (approximately five percentage points) in the rice that is diverted.  
 
Second, comparing performance of the states between the two thick rounds, we find that 
across states things got worse. At the all India level, the leakages from the PDS increased 
from 24% to 54%. Even among the better performing southern states (for instance, Kerala) 
there was a deterioration. 
 
                                                 
7 See R. Krishnakumar (1997) and M. Suchitra (2004) on the recent history of the PDS in Kerala. 
  5Next we compare the performance between the last "thick" round (i.e., 61st, pertaining to 
2004-5) and more recent but "thin" rounds of the NSS for which data is available (63rd and 
64th round). This comparison indicates that things have improved, though only marginally, at 
the all India level. The overall diversion of grain has come down from 54%  in 2004-5 to 
44% in 2007-8. In spite of this marginal improvement, diversion rates were higher in 2007-8, 
than in the pre-TPDS period (i.e., in 1999-2000 when 24% of wheat and rice were diverted). 
 
In the absence of any diversion, all states could have been categorized as "functioning" states. 
However, given high diversion rates in many states, I use the all India diversion rate as the 
benchmark for classification of states as "languishing", "reforming" or "functioning". States 
with a diversion rate lower than the all India figure are classified as "functioning" and with a 
higher rate than the all India average are labelled "languishing". "Reforming" states are those 
where diversion rates have fallen since 2004-5.  
 
By and large, the grouping of states as languishing, reforming and functioning remains the 
same whether we use per capita PDS purchase (as has been done above) or diversion to 
categorize them. Two states, namely Haryana and Punjab, get re-categorized depending on 
whether we look at per capita PDS purchase or diversion. Haryana and Punjab are among the 
"languishing" states if we consider per capita PDS purchase, but are "reforming" states based 
on the trend in diversion. One plausible explanation for this is that while what the PDS 
delivers in these two states has not undergone much change, the allocation/offtake have gone 
down, which has led to an improvement in terms of diversion.  
 
Note also that among the so-called "functioning" states, two states (Maharashtra and 
Karnataka) have very high levels of diversion (just over 40%). This is also true of some of the 
"reforming" states where in spite of improvement in recent years the level of diversion 
remains high at the end of the period. 
 
There is also a regional dimension to diversion rates, with the bulk of the functioning states 
falling in the peninsular region, whereas, barring Rajasthan and Gujarat, the languishing 
states are concentrated in the eastern part of the country (Assam, Bihar, Jharkhand and West 
Bengal).  
 
4. Methodological Issues 
 
4.1 Possible Under-recording of PDS purchases in the NSS 
 
The main question here is whether there are measurement errors in the NSS data as far as 
purchase of PDS grain is concerned. There are two possible reasons why this may need 
investigation: one, in Deaton and Drèze, 2009, they find that for some years, the NSS 
somewhat understates total cereal consumption in India, compared with total availability that 
according to Ministry of Agriculture (see Figure 6, p. 50). If under-recording of PDS 
purchase (distinct from total cereal consumption) is an issue, using the method outlined 
above would lead us to automatically attribute this underestimation, or some part of it, to 
diversion. Second, it is possible that there is under-recording of PDS purchases in NSS data. 
For instance, in the case of the mid-day meal scheme, the proportion of children benefiting 
from the mid-day meal are much lower according to NSS than from other data sources (see 
  6for instance De et al, forthcoming and Pratham, 2011) and independent field evidence.
8 This 
suggests that crosschecking PDS purchase against other data sources might be a useful 
exercise. NSS data on consumption is based on recall for the past 30 days which require 
investigators to spend time carefully reconstructing purchase figures for each item.
9 Field 
evidence indicates that the improvement in the Chhattisgarh PDS began after 2004, when 
PDS reforms were initiated. Indeed, NSS data do reflect a rising trend in per capita PDS 
purchase has been rising since then. However, as shown in Section 4.3 below, the estimated 
diversion rate remained high in 2007-8.  It would be interesting to see whether data from the 
next NSS round (pertaining to 2008-9) reflects the improvements reported in smaller field 
studies in recent years. 
 
In Table 3, I present an alternative set of estimates of diversion using data from the Indian 
Human Development Survey (IHDS). This survey conducted in 2004-5 collected information 
on total cereal consumption as well as PDS purchase of wheat and rice from all sample 
households.
10 Despite its smaller sample, the IHDS data offer an important opportunity to 
crosscheck PDS purchase data reported by the NSS.  
 
Panel A of Table 3, I compare recorded per capita purchase of wheat and rice from two 
sources: the IHDS and NSS data, both pertaining to 2004-5. These averages have been 
reported separately for rural and urban areas. The table suggests that average PDS purchase 
are of similar magnitude irrespective of which data source we use.
11 To illustrate, according 
to NSS data, at the all India level per capita purchase of rice (wheat) was 0.84 (0.35) and 0.54 
(0.17) in rural and urban areas respectively. According to the IHDS survey, the corresponding 
figures are 0.91 (0.37) and 0.56 (0.21) respectively. Further, the state-wise patterns remain 
the same for both data sets: states that perform well according to the NSS also perform well 
according to IHDS data. Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, 
Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu are the top five states according to both data sources and Bihar is 
at the bottom no matter which data set we use.
  
 
Panel B of Table 3 compares the overall diversion using NSS and IHDS. Overall, diversion is 
marginally lower if one uses IHDS (50.5%) than NSS (54.0%). In a handful of states,   
diversion of grain is higher as per IHDS. These include mainly the stagnating states (Assam, 
Bihar, West Bengal, Punjab and Haryana), but also Madhya Pradesh and Kerala. In several of 
the other states, diversions as per IHDS data are lower by a margin of more than ten 
percentage points (including states like Jharkhand and Rajasthan). However, given the 
considerably smaller sample size of IHDS survey (approximately 40,000 households), one 
can only treat these estimates as supplements to NSS data. 
 
                                                 
8 According to De et al (forthcoming) and Pratham (2011), mid-day meals were served in 84% (in 2006) and 
83% (in 2010) of schools. According to NSS data (2004-5), only 22.5% of rural households and 8% of urban 
households were benefiting from the scheme (Government of India, 2007).  
9 In an informal conversation with an NSS investigator, it has been learnt that some investigators mark items on 
the NSS schedule that are consumed by the household during their household visit, but data on actual quantities 
consumed involves an element of informed guesswork (Jean Drèze, personal communication). If this is a a more 
widespread practice, recorded PDS purchases may not be accurate. Further, in such cases, sudden and marked 
changes in the performance of the PDS, are likely to be reflected in the NSS data with a lag, as knowledge of 
such "jumps" may take time to become widespread enough to inform guesses.  
10 The IHDS questionnaire is modelled on the Consumption Expenditure Survey of the NSS. 
11 In the case of the IHDS data, all "missing" values have been recoded as zeros. Coding in this manner has the 
effect of allowing us to calculate the "upper bound" for diversions. The average per capita purchase declines 
from 3.05kg/month to 0.91kg/month for rice in rural areas when missing values are treated as zeros.  
  74.2 Choice of Multiplier: NSS vs. Census projections  
 
Another issue to bear in mind is the choice of multiplier for aggregating per capita PDS 
purchase up to the state level. There are two obvious choices for this: census population 
projections and NSS population multipliers. The norm, in so far as estimation of diversion is 
concerned, has been to use census population projections. In addition to that, I use NSS 
multipliers here to get estimates of total rural and urban population. Using NSS "population" 
multipliers can provide a useful check for the reliability of population projections made by 
the Census of India.
12  
 
Table 4 presents the estimated diversion using these two alternative methods using the 
multipliers from the 61st NSS round (pertaining to 2004-5). The proportion of grain diverted 
if one uses the NSS multipliers is very similar to the estimates that we got using population 
projection calculated by the Census of India. At the all India level, 47 and 73 per cent of the 
rice and wheat respectively are diverted. These estimates are slightly higher than the ones 
using census population projections - 41 and 70 per cent respectively for rice and wheat. In 
this note therefore, I use the census projections to calculate diversion over the different years. 
 
4.3 Procurement by state governments and Accounting practices 
 
The FCI procures wheat and rice through its network across the country. In addition to 
procurement by FCI directly, in some states, the state's food and civil supply corporations 
also procure grain through the "Decentralized Procurement Scheme". Grain thus procured 
may be used to contribute to the central pool of grain, or by the state to augment its supply of 
grain for the PDS or in some cases, even sold to other state governments for their PDS 
through their Open Market Sales (OMS) operations.
13 
 
Statewise procurement figures for 2004-5, 2006-7, 2007-8 and 2008-9 are given in Table 5.
14 
This table shows that decentralized procurement has been much more of a success in the case 
of rice, than wheat. In 2008-9, Andhra Pradesh and Punjab contributed just over half of total 
paddy procurement by FCI; further, there has been substantial improvement in procurement 
by Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh (each state contributes close to one-tenth of total 
procurement). On the other hand, in the case of wheat, procurement remains heavily 
concentrated in a two states: in 2004-5, more than 90 per cent of the wheat was procured 
from Haryana and Punjab alone. In the last year for which data is available (2008-9), the 
share of these two states declined to about 70 per cent of total wheat procurement.  
 
The Centre allocates grain to states in accordance with the proportion of BPL families fixed 
by the Planning Commission. Where states have expanded the PDS (e.g., Andhra Pradesh, 
Tamil Nadu, among others, see Table 7) the actual number of BPL households is higher than 
that sanctioned by the Central government. When states increase the coverage of BPL 
households, their grain requirements rise above what the Centre provides to them at BPL 
prices. One option that states have is to spread the Centre's allocation (of 35 kg per BPL 
household) over a larger number of households by reducing per household entitlements. For 
                                                 
12 The NSS does not rely entirely on census projections. The NSS multipliers are based on their own methods of 
house listing etc. and are likely to be more reliable (Angus Deaton, personal communication). 
13 For example, the Government of Tamil Nadu purchases grain from the Andhra Pradesh Civil Supplies 
Corporation. 
14 Procurement here refers to what the state governments are procuring on behalf of the FCI. It does not reflect 
what share of this is retained by the state to "top up" FCI allocations. 
  8instance, the Government of Tamil Nadu gives only 20kg per household but to all households 
irrespective of whether they are APL or BPL. The second option available to states is to 
purchase the additional grain required, either from the Food Corporation of India or locally 
(i.e., within the state, through the state civil supplies corporation). This is being done, for 
instance, in Chhattisgarh and Tamil Nadu. Yet another option is to take grain provided for 
APL households at higher prices and use it to meet the needs of the additional BPL 
households (as is done in Andhra Pradesh among other states). By a combination of these 
measures, the government of Tamil Nadu has been able to run a universal PDS.  
 
Chhattisgarh, Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh (among others) are states that augment 
centrally allocated grain (through OMS purchases or "state pool" contributions).
15 Where 
states augment foodgrain supply, using the allocation and offtake figures reported in the 
Monthly Foodgrains Bulletin would be incorrect because that only reports allocation and 
offtake from what is called the "central pool". This would lead to underestimation of grain 
diversion. To get an accurate estimate, in such cases one would have to add to the offtake 
figure, the grain allocated/offtake to the PDS by the state from local procurement and other 
sources.  
 
As information on which states currently "top up" FCI allocations is not readily available, I 
take a closer look at these two issues using data from Chhattisgarh and Tamil Nadu for 2007-
8 for which I have the required data from the state governments.
16 The choice of year is 
obvious: it is the first year in which Chhattisgarh began to contribute rice (on top of 
allocations from the central pool) in order to run an expanded PDS. The Department of Food 
of the Government of Chhattisgarh provides data on rice and wheat by source: the state's 
contribution as well as allocation and offtake from the central pool of the FCI. In the case of 
Tamil Nadu, the Department of Food provided offtake and "liftment" from the central pool.
17 
"Liftment" refers to the data that is sold at the PDS outlet. Note, that Tamil Nadu is probably 
the only state in the country that has a system for tracking sales at the PDS outlet. These data 
are presented in Table 6. 
 
The first point to note is that there is a small discrepancy in "offtake" data as reported in the 
Monthly Foodgrains Bulletin and the data provided by the respective state governments. 
Though the reason for this discrepancy is not clear, it could be attributed to leakages, transit 
losses, lags in accounting and so on.  
 
The second important point is that when we add Chhattisgarh state's contribution to estimate 
diversion, the proportion of foodgrain diverted in Chhattisgarh in 2007-8 jumps from -1 
percent to 37.7 percent - only marginally lower than the all India diversion average of 
44.3%.
18 Note, however, that such revisions would be required only in those states where FCI 
allocations are "topped up" by state government. It is quite likely that an exercise of this sort 
may be required only in Chhattisgarh and Tamil Nadu (that too for selected years only), but 
this data gap at the Central level needs to be remedied (on this see section 4.4 below). 
                                                 
15 Which states are currently topping up FCI allocations is not easy to find out. See discussion in section 4.4. on 
data gaps.  
16 Note, that in most states that have "expanded" the PDS, the tendency is to spread existing FCI allocations over 
a larger population. This is done, for instance, in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Kerala, Karnataka, among others 
(see Table 7). 
17 In 2007-8, Tamil Nadu did not augment its foodgrain supply from either the state pool or OMS. 
18 Note that estimates of diversion reported in Himanshu and Sen (2011) present Chhattisgarh as a turnaround. 
This could be because they fail to take into account the contribution to the PDS from the "state pool". 
  9 
Another minor clarification relates to making a distinction between the state's offtake from 
the FCI and what is actually sold through ration shops. Data on sales from PDS outlets is 
available from the Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation.
19 Comparing diversion figures 
using FCI offtake data and sales data, the diversion figures for Tamil Nadu come down from 
13% to 8%.  
 
Finally, note that for some states, using the method above, the estimated proportion of grain 
diverted is negative. This means that more grain is bought from ration shops than is supplied 
according to the Monthly Foodgrain Bulletin. Using lags (i.e., offtake of grain allocated this 
month may happen in subsequent months) does not resolve this issue. This also suggests that 
further streamlining of this methodology is required and diversion figures must be taken as 
illustrative.  
 
4.4 Data gaps 
 
There are several data gaps that hinder an exercise of this sort. Estimates on transport and 
storage losses are not available. Even basic information on coverage and entitlements in each 
state is not compiled accurately at the Central level. Table 7 which reconstructs these 
entitlements relies on state government websites, online newspaper reports and so on. Data 
on the states' contribution to the PDS (mentioned above) are also not readily available. There 
is no easy way of finding out which states are augmenting FCI supplies of grain with their 
own purchases. There are other such gaps: e.g., the Monthly Foodgrains Bulletin which used 
to be available on the website of the Department of Food and Civil Supplies until 2005, is no 
longer publicly available. These and other data gaps need to be addressed immediately. 
 
5. Discussion on reforming and functioning states 
 
Some recent state-level PDS initiatives are listed in Table 7. When the TPDS was introduced, 
the Central government began allocating subsidized foodgrain for those households that were 
classified as below poverty line (BPL). The proportion of BPL households in each state, in 
turn, was decided on the basis of the 1993-4 poverty estimates of the Planning Commission. 
This compelled state governments to "downsize" their PDS in accordance with what they got 
from the Central government once the TPDS was introduced. However, a few years into the 
TPDS, several states realised that the TPDS led to the exclusion of several poor households. 
For instance, according to NSS data from 2004-5, only 53% of rural households belonging to 
the poorest MPCE quintile had a BPL ration card.
20 These large exclusion errors can be 
attributed to the small TPDS coverage (in other words, the Planning Commission's poverty 
estimates were too low) and also because the poor design and implementation of the survey 
for selection of BPL households. As a partial remedy to this, (at least) since 2006, state 
governments began to spend state resources to increase the coverage, or provide additional 
subsidy to those households covered by the TPDS. As Table 7 shows, in several states, the 
PDS is now quasi-universal (Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Karnataka, 
Himachal Pradesh). In many others, states governments have expanded the coverage (e.g., 
Rajasthan) and/or reduced prices (e.g., Jharkhand). The additional subsidy burden is borne 
                                                 
19 It is possible to get this data from Tamil Nadu because it has been a pioneering state as far as computerization 
of stock holdings down to the ration shop level is concerned. Other states have also undertaken similar 
initiatives. 
20 See Drèze and Khera (2010a). See also Swaminathan (2008) on social exclusion from the PDS. 
  10either by reducing quantities (e.g., from 35kg or 20kg in Madhya Pradesh) supplied to 
eligible households and by putting in additional state resources. 
 
Among the functioning states four states deserve a more detailed discussion on the possible 
explanations for the improvement. These four states are Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh 
Kerala and Tamil Nadu. As mentioned earlier, one possible explanation for the better 
performance of certain states (than others or over time) could be that the PDS remained (or 
became) universal or close to universal because of extra commitment of resources by the state 
government. The states that have done this include Tamil Nadu (where the PDS is universal, 
both in rural and urban areas), Himachal Pradesh (where APL families continue to get wheat 
and rice from the PDS, albeit at a higher price than BPL households). Andhra Pradesh runs a 
quasi-universal PDS: it covers many more households than the Centre provides for and also 
provides an additional subsidy on the issue price (only Rs. 2/kg for rice).
21 Each of these 
functioning states (in 2007-8) have shown a consistent improvement over the reference 
period. At least two (Himachal and Tamil Nadu) of these states have a well established record 
of good performance in social welfare schemes.
22 A counter-example to this is Kerala. In the 
pre-1997 period, in fact Kerala was the only state in which access to the PDS was close to 
universal. In most other  parts of the country, PDS coverage in rural areas remained poor. 
When the TPDS was introduced in 1997, Kerala was forced to reduce its PDS coverage. The 
initial crash in per capita purchase has already been referred to in section 3.1 (see also Tables 
1A and 1B).  
 
What could be behind the improvements noticeable in the reforming states? Khera (2011) 
discusses two alternative sets of explanations: demand-side and supply-side factors - that 
could affect PDS purchase by households. A common feature across the reforming states is 
that the PDS has been expanded (e.g. by increasing coverage, or the implicit subsidy) in 
recent years in these states. For instance, in Chhattisgarh the state provides an additional 
subsidy and has increased the coverage of the PDS to approximately 80% of rural households 
(from just 45%). Field-based evidence from the reforming states suggests that when the issue 
price is lowered, say to Re 1/kg or Rs. 2/kg, people are unwilling to let go of their grain. 
These are referred to as "demand-side" factors that contribute to enhancing voice. The 
expansion of the PDS has been accompanied by other supply-side PDS reforms (e.g., 
computerization of records, deprivatization of PDS shops). In Chhattisgarh, the revival of the 
PDS in recent years has also received some attention.
23 Political commitment to the 
programme has also been an important part of the reform in these states. 
 
Another factor behind the observed pattern in the reforming states, could be the increased 
difference between market price and PDS price in recent years. The gap between market and 
PDS price has grown because of a rise in market prices and because many states have 
lowered the PDS issue price. This has had the effect of increasing the interest of both the state 
government and of BPL cardholders in taking as much as possible from the central pool and 
PDS shop respectively. As market prices of wheat and rice have risen, grain sold at APL 
prices by the FCI has become cheaper than the open market. This is one of the reasons why 
state offtake of APL grain has been high in recent years.
24  
                                                 
21 Andhra Pradesh never really followed the Central directives on conducting a BPL survey in 1997 and 2002. 
22 See Drèze (1997 and 2003), S. Vivek (2010), Bhatty (2006). 
23 See Dhand et al (2008), Shukla (2009), Drèze (2010), Drèze and Khera (2010b), Patnaik (2010) and 
Himanshu and Sen (2011). 
24 Another important reason for high APL offtake rates is that in 2006, FCI fixed APL allocation for states based 
on the state's offtake record prior to that year (Himanshu, 2011). 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper, I estimate the "leakages" of wheat and rice through the PDS in India. In doing 
so, I discuss several methodological issues which make the precise estimation of such 
leakages difficult. In particular, I discuss the possibility of measurement errors in the NSS 
data on PDS purchase by households, the unreliability of population projections made by the 
Census of India and the effect of decentralized procurement by state food and civil supplies 
corporations. The discussion on methodological issues, including the fact that all leakages 
(storage and transport losses included) have to be attributed to corrupt practices, indicates that 
estimates of diversion estimated in this manner, must be treated as the upper bound on illegal 
diversion of PDS grain.  
 
Imprecise as these estimates may be, computing these proportions over a period of time is 
still a useful exercise because one can get a sense of which direction things are moving in. 
Looking at the overall proportion of grain diverted, between 1999-2000 and 2007-8 (i.e., the 
55th and 64rd rounds of the NSS), the situation is far from encouraging. At the beginning of 
the period, 24% of grain was diverted. The situation got worse until 2004-5 when 54% of 
grain leaked but since then, there has been a reversal of that trend. At the end of the period, 
44% of PDS grain was diverted at the all India level.   
 
However, when one studies trends disaggregated by state, the picture is very mixed. Based on 
level of per capita PDS purchase and trends, I classify states into three broad categories: 
"functioning" states, "reforming" states and "languishing" states. The states that fall in the 
first category are not surprising, as they have a good record on implementation of various 
social welfare schemes. Apart from the southern states, this category includes HP and JK in 
the north and Maharashtra. On the other hand, the "languishing" states are not very surprising 
either. Assam, Bihar, Jharkhand, West Bengal have a poor record on other socio-economic 
indicators too. The interesting category is that of "reforming" states, which includes 
Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh (though the last state just about 
manages to join this category).  
  
The performance of the PDS is a typical case of the glass being half full and half empty at the 
same time. This paper documents both sides of the story, to highlight the need for further 
research that would help understand the consistently poor performance in some states and 
reasons behind improvement in others. Understanding these trends is especially important in 






























































































































































































Source: Calculated from NSS data for relevant years.

























































Source: Calculated from NSS data for relevant years.
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Source: Calculated using data on offtake reported in the Monthly Foodgrains Bulletin and NSS data on household Table 1A. Per capita purchase of PDS rice (kg/month) 
rural Urban 
  1999-2000  2001-02 2004-5 2006-7 2007-8  1999-2000  2001-02 2004-05 2006-7 2007-8 
AP  2.3  1.8  2.57 3.17 3.48 1.21 1.1 1.39 1.9 1.85
AS  0.71  0.6 0.48 1.11 1.01 0.57 0.3  0.18 0.47 0.03
BI 0  0.0 0.04 0.1 0.07 0.07 0.1  0.04 0.06 0.06
Chh  NA  0.4 1.45 2.4 3.17 NA 0.3  0.94 1.08 1.2
Guj  0.38  0.2 0.24 0.3 0.26 0.19 0.1  0.06 0.08 0.05
Har 0  0.0 0 0.12 0.09 0 0.0  0  0.16 0.04
HP  1.52  1.6 2.05 2.33 2.67 0.67 0.4  0.68 1.12 1.56
JK  2.1  0.8  2.78 4.52 3.05 4.11 2.5 4.65 5.2 4.68
JH  NA  0.1 0.15 0.22 0.31 NA 0.0  0.12 0.07 0.08
KA  1.2  1.4 2.39 2.16 1.85 0.85 0.3  1.01 0.92 0.56
KE  4.14  1.8 1.71 2.04 2.24 3.48 0.8  1.22 1.54 1.54
MP  0.22 0.1  0.36 0.29 0.46 0.09 0.1 0.1  0.17 0.19
MA  0.47  0.4 0.61 0.77 0.85 0.24 0.1  0.13 0.17 0.13
OR  1.53  1.2 0.9 1.29 1.93 1.34 0.2 0.31  0.71 0.97
PU 0  0.0 0 0.05 0.01 0 0.0  0 0 0
RAJ 0  0.0 0 0.03 0.04 0 0.0  0  0.11 0.07
TN  3.16  3.4 4.13 4.7 4.84 2.14 1.8  2.46 3.36 3.19
UP  0.11  0.1 0.14 0.43 0.64 0.08 0.0  0.05 0.16 0.14
UTT  NA  0.2 1.04 1.1 1.14 NA 0.1  0.09 0.19 0.43
WB  0.23  0.2 0.27 0.35 0.4 0.23 0.1  0.14 0.16 0.14
INDIA   0.7 0.84 1.05 1.18   0.4  0.54 0.75 0.69
Table 1B Per capita purchase of PDS wheat (kg/month) 
Rural Urban 
  1999-2000  2001-2 2004-5 2006-7 2007-8 1999-2000  2001-2 2004-5 2006-7 2007-8
AP  0 0.0  0 0.01 0.01 0.27 0.1  0.01  0.04 0.05
AS  0 0.0  0 0.01 0.02 0 0.0  0  0.02 0.01
BI  0.15 0.0  0.06 0.07 0.09 0.16 0.0  0.08  0.06 0.09
Chh   0.1  0.08 0.07 0.03  0.0  0.14  0.03 0.03
Guj  0.55 0.5  0.54 0.48 0.43 0.3 0.3  0.16  0.18 0.13
Har  0 0.0  0.23 0.64 0.55 0 0.1  0.36  0.57 0.27
HP  1.27 0.5  1.25 1.67 2.46 0.7 0.2  0.36  1.19 2.01
JK  0.66 0.1  0.31 0.47 0.67 0.97 0.5  0.46  1 0.94
JH   0.1  0.11 0.18 0.14  0.0  0.09  0.07 0.05
KA  0.3 0.3  0.42 0.35 0.36 0.31 0.1  0.17  0.18 0.1
KE  0.44 0.1  0.17 0.3 0.31 0.54 0.1  0.17  0.29 0.29
MP  0.16 0.5  0.91 0.62 1.1 0.15 0.4  0.55  0.41 0.62
MA  0.67 0.5  0.86 0.88 0.88 0.32 0.2  0.28 0.3 0.19
OR  0 0.0  0 0.01 0 0.34 0.0  0.02  0.09 0.05
PU  0 0.0  0.02 0.05 0.54 0.11 0.0  0.05  0.06 0.32
RAJ  0.2 0.3  0.89 0.6 0.63 0.18 0.1  0.16  0.48 0.54
TN  0.14 0.0  0.08 0.12 0.14 0.34 0.1  0.12 0.2 0.17
UP  0.18 0.2  0.19 0.3 0.41 0.19 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.15
UTT   0.4  0.83 0.75 1.01  0.0  0.07  0.05 0.44
WB  0.15 0.1  0.15 0.17 0.22 0.39 0.1  0.08 0.1 0.14
INDIA   0.2  0.35 0.31 0.39  0.1  0.17  0.22 0.21
Source: Author's calculations using NSS data. Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Uttarakhand were created 
as news states in 2000, therefore there are no estimates for those states for 1999-2000.
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Table 2: Diversion of PDS grain
1  
 
1999-2000 2001-2  2004-5  2006-7  2007-8   
 Rice  Wheat  Foodgrain  Rice  Wheat  Foodgrain Rice  Wheat Foodgrain Rice  Wheat Foodgrain Rice  Wheat Foodgrain 
AP 15.2  14.4 15.2  12.3 -210.8 11.2 22.3 93.0 23.2 16.1 66.9 17.0 19.2 50.3  19.6 
AS 54.7  100 65.3  69.4 98.1 74.9 83.5 100.0 88.7 72.4 98.4 76.6 73.0 97.5  77.5 
BI 94.6  75.2 80.2  77.3 91.6 88.3 84.8 92.8 91.0 83.6 84.4 84.0 92.4 85.1 89.5 
Chh     45.8 33.4 43.2 45.1 82.6 51.8 28.9 65.3 30.9 -3.1 57.0  -1.5 
Guj -23.9 8.2 -2.5  35.6 27.3 29.8 52.7 51.3 51.7 66.1 39.6 53.2 73.0 53.3  63.1 
Har 0  100 100  94.0 94.0 -  82.7 82.7 39.5 29.4 31.4 61.8 48.8  51.1 
HP -  - -  26.0 43.8 31.2 7.0 46.2 27.0 11.6 32.4 21.8 12.9 14.3  13.6 
JK -1.4  -80.3 -12.3  54.1 79.0 60.7 -8.9 79.4 23.0 -36.5 66.4 -1.0 7.6 59.1 24.3 
JH     71.5 83.0 79.1 82.3 87.9 85.2 86.4 80.9 84.4 83.3 85.2  84.0 
KA 17.1  21.0 18.0  47.0 53.7 48.4 25.8 41.7 28.7 32.6 34.4 32.9 42.2 33.4  41.0 
KE -44.7  5.9 -36.9  -28.6 66.9 0.0 -1.9 78.9 25.6 0.8 55.3 14.8 3.5 55.6  16.2 
MP 59.3  18.2 46.9  50.8 46.4 47.4 12.9 56.7 50.1 52.8 64.0 61.1 20.8 39.9  35.5 
MA 24.4  33.3 29.9  40.0 53.2 48.3 46.5 51.0 49.3 44.6 38.5 41.4 40.7 44.1  42.5 
OR 26.8  87.5 36.7  21.4 -  21.0 74.1 99.0 76.3 53.4 91.5 57.0 46.2 97.1  50.2 
PU 100  -107.0 -52.9  92.5 87.7 87.9 100.0 93.1 93.2 71.9 81.1 78.5 17.6 18.4 18.4 
RAJ 100  53.0 53.4  76.1 75.8 75.8 100.0 93.9 93.9 69.8 83.5 81.9 75.7 82.0  81.2 
TN -12.3  -21.7 -13  -79.2 -  0.0 9.4 -86.7 7.3 2.4 -105.6 -0.7 8.7 -186.1  4.4 
UP 46.6  17.4 31.1  77.4 67.1 69.7 85.4 36.7 58.0 72.3 7.8 50.5 52.9 -14.5  26.7 
UTT     -109.8 -810.0 0.0 44.2 84.8 59.4 44.2 88.3 63.3 33.3 70.9  48.5 
WB 23.8  70.9 57.3  42.4 84.0 67.3 70.4 85.0 80.6 72.4 80.4 76.8 70.8 77.9  74.8 





figures. For 2004-5, population proj
2007 (2008) has been used. Population projectio
: 1. Proportion (%) of grain offtake from FCI, that does not reach households. 2. For a discussion of "negative" diversion estimates, see 
: "Offtake" data from Monthly Foodgrains Bulletin published by Government of India. I use total (BPL, APL and Antyodaya) offtake 
ections for 1 March, 2005 have been used. Similarly for 2006-7 (2007-8), projected population on 1 March 
ns have been taken from Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner (2006). 
 Table 3 Purchase and Diversion of grain (2004-5): NSS vs. IHDS 
 
Panel A: Per capita purchase of PDS (kg/mont)  Panel B: Diversion of wheat and rice
1 
Rice Wheat   
Rural Urban  Rural  Urban  IHDS  NSS 
 
IHDS NSS IHDS NSS  IHDS  NSS IHDS  NSS  Rice  Wheat Foodgrain Rice  Wheat Foodgrain 
AP  2.89 2.57 1.44 1.39 0.02 0 0.02 0.01  13.77 49.35 14.25 22.27 93.04 23.23 
AS  0.12 0.48 0.13 0.18 0 0 0.01 0  95.43 99.89 96.83 83.46 100.00 88.68 
BI  0.01 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.08  95.39 98.60 97.85 84.75 92.82 90.95 
Chh  1.6 1.45 0.76 0.94 0.17 0.08 0.07 0.14  41.78 72.01 47.18 45.05 82.55 51.75 
Guj  0.23 0.24 0.2  0.06 0.41 0.54 0.28 0.16  39.40 55.46 50.50 52.66 51.29 51.71 
Har  0 0 0 0 0.09 0.23 0.01 0.36  - 95.81 95.81 -  82.68 82.68 
HP  1.91 2.05 1.16 0.68 2.18 1.25 1.02 0.36  10.67 4.24 7.38 6.95 46.17 27.03 
JK  4.52 2.78 4.52 4.65 0.28 0.31 0.47 0.46  -51.10 80.60 -3.49 -8.94 79.43 23.01 
JH  0.28 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.21 0.11 0.11 0.09  69.51 78.53 74.19 82.25 87.91 85.19 
KA  2.61 2.39 0.93 1.01 0.58 0.42 0.21 0.17  21.35 20.99 21.28 25.80 41.67 28.68 
KE  1.13 1.71 0.47 1.22 0.28 0.17 0.12 0.17  38.24 70.30 49.17 -1.91 78.85 25.62 
MP  0.28 0.36 0.17  0.1 0.73 0.91 0.68 0.55  24.79 61.81 56.23 12.90 56.67 50.07 
MA  0.83 0.61 0.18 0.13 1.46 0.86 0.35 0.28  27.07 21.34 23.49 46.53 51.04 49.34 
OR  0.94 0.9 0.56 0.31 0 0 0.03 0.02  71.81 98.43 74.13 74.14 98.95 76.31 
PU  0.01 0 0 0 0 0.02 0 0.05  -50.92 100.00 98.58 100.00 93.14 93.20 
RAJ  0 0 0 0 0.67 0.89 0.25 0.16  100.00 82.68 82.69 100.00 93.90 93.90 
TN  3.7 4.13 2.41 2.46 0.29 0.08 0.35 0.12  16.16 -262.47 9.95 9.44 -86.71 7.29 
UP  0.24 0.14 0.1  0.05 0.26 0.19 0.1 0.1  74.57 35.21 52.40 85.38 36.69 57.95 
UTT  1.19 1.04 0.13 0.09 0.85 0.83 0.1 0.07  35.61 86.46 54.70 44.17 84.81 59.43 
WB  0.13 0.27 0.03 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.03 0.08  87.08 85.00 85.63 70.38 85.02 80.61 
INDIA  0.91 0.84 0.56 0.54 0.37 0.35 0.21 0.17  36.97 67.70 50.45 41.30 70.27 54.01 
 
Note: 1. Proportion (%) of grain offtake from FCI, that does not reach households. 
Source: Author's calculation using IHDS and National Sample Survey data pertaining to 2004-5. 
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Table 4: Diversion of PDS Grain, 2004-5:
1  
Census population projection vs. NSS multipliers 
 
  Based on Census 
projections 
Based on NSS multipliers 
  Rice Wheat Rice Wheat 
AP  22.27 93.04 28.4 94.1 
AS  83.46 100.00 84.8 100.0 
BI  84.75 92.82 87.4 94.1 
Chh  45.05 82.55 45.7 83.8 
Guj  52.66 51.29 56.9 55.9 
Har  - 82.68 -  84.0 
HP  6.95 46.17 10.0 47.9 
JK  -8.94 79.43 31.8 87.1 
JH  82.25 87.91 84.9 89.7 
KA  25.80 41.67 32.1 46.6 
KE  -1.91 78.85 4.2 80.3 
MP  12.90 56.67 17.2 59.4 
MA  46.53 51.04 50.1 54.7 
OR  74.14 98.95 74.6 99.1 
PU  100.00 93.14 100.0 94.0 
RAJ  100.00 93.90 100.0 94.5 
TN  9.44 -86.71 17.6 -69.1 
UP  85.38 36.69 86.4 40.9 
UTT  44.17 84.81 46.8 85.8 
WB  70.38 85.02 71.7 85.5 
INDIA  41.30 70.27 46.7 72.8 
 
Note: 1. Proportion (%) of grain offtake from FCI, that does not reach households. 
Sources: Population projections have been taken from Office of the Registrar General and 
Census Commissioner (2006). Table 5. Procurement of rice and wheat (lakh tonnes)  
 
2004-5 2006-7  2007-8  2008-9   
Rice   Wheat   Rice   Wheat   Rice   Wheat   Rice   Wheat 
Andhra    39.0  -  53   74   90.61   
Bihar  3.4  0.01 4.6 0.08  5.12  5.0 10.83  4.97 
Chhattisgarh  28.4  -  28.65   27.43   28.48  
Haryana    16.6  45.3  17.77 33.5  15.72 52.31 14.25 69.24 
Madhya  Pradesh  - 4.8   0.57   24.1   19.68 
Maharashtra  2.1  -  0.97   1.6    2.61  
Orissa  15.9  -  20.02   23.38   27.90  
Punjab  91.1  90.1  78.29 67.81  79.08 99.39 85.53 107.25
Rajasthan    1.6   3.83   9.35   11.52 
Tamil  Nadu  6.5  -  10.77   9.68    11.99  
Uttaranchal    0.4   0.02   0.85   1.45 
Uttar  Pradesh  29.7  5.6  25.59 5.46  28.91 31.37 36.87 38.82 
West  Bengal  9.4  -  6.42    15.08   16.67  
Others  4.7  0.02         
Total  246.8  147.9  251.07 111.27  284.91 226.82 336.84 253.82
 
Source: Government of India (2005b) and Government of India (2010), Table 8.19. Also 
available online at www.indiabudget.nic.in 
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Table 6: Comparison of data on Offtake: State vs. FCI 
 
Panel A  Panel B  Panel C  Panel D 




  Tamil Nadu  Chhattisgarh  Tamil Nadu  Chhattisgarh Tamil  Nadu  Chhattisgarh 
July, 2007  308.644  77.683  280.772  69391.84  386.327  36340 
Aug, 2007  354.127  51.303  277.467  64619.89  405.43  33290 
Sept, 2007  294.281  42.367  278.145  61261.13  336.648  33290 
Oct, 2007  316.008  45.775  282.468  67136.66  361.783  33290 
Nov, 2007  257.272  64.064  283.514  67137.66  321.336  42878 
Dec, 2007  208.505  67.242  288.683  67137.66  275.747  42878 
Jan, 2008  227.201  66.783  289.286  58751.76  293.984  36944 
Feb, 2008  234  66.854  289.848  71682.57  300.854  41508 
Mar, 2008  414.908  66.678  287.966  64246.07  481.586  42029 
Apr, 2008  288.026  63.979  285.174  64229.4  352.005  43436 
May, 2008  414.908  66.678  284.647  65350.37  481.586  51728 
Jun, 2008  283.188  63.979  286.872  64220.25  347.167  37179 
 3601.07  743.39  3414.84  785.17  4344.45  474.79 
 
Notes: 1. "Offtake from FCI" refers to offtake figures by state as reported in the Monthly Foodgrains Bulletin. 2. "Offtake from state" refers to 
offtake figures provided by respective state governments. 3. "Liftment" refers to what has been purchased by households from PDS ration shops. 
Tamil Nadu has a system to track these purchases. 4. "State contribution to PDS" refers to the rice allocated by the Government of Chhattisgarh. 
This is over and above the rice allocations to the state from FCI. 
 
Sources:  1. Panel A: Data from Monthly Foodgrains Bulletin, Various Issues, published by Government of India; 2. Panel B: Unpublished data 
kindly provided by the Department of Food, Government of Chhattisgarh and Government of Tamil Nadu; 3. Panel C: Unpublished Data 
provided by Deparment of Food, GoTN; 4. Panel D: Unpublished Data provided by Department of Food,  Government of Chhattisgarh.  Table 7: Some State-Level Initiatives in the PDS 
BPL cards (lakhs)  State Year 
Allocated Actual 
BPL APL 
Andhra Pradesh  Price reduction, 7 April 2008  40.63  175.5  20kg rice max (Rs. 2/kg)  30kg rice (Rs. 9/kg) 
Chhattisgarh  Price reduction 2007 & December 
2008; Expansion in 2007 
18.75  36  35kg (Rs. 2/kg),    - 
Himachal Pradesh  -  5.14  3.17  35kg (Central Issue Price)  35kg (Central Issue Price) 
Jammu & Kashmir  -  7.36  4.8  35kg (Central Issue Price)  35kg (Central Issue Price) 
Jharkhand  Price reduction, October 2010  23.94  14.76  35kg (Rs. 1/kg rice)  - 
Karnataka  April 2005  31.29  76.77  25 kg rice/wheat (Rs. 3/kg)  13 kg rice, 3 kg wheat 
(Rs. 6.7/9/kg) 
Kerala  At least since 2006  15.54  14.82  25kg rice (Rs. 3/kg)  35kg (Rs. 8.9 rice; Rs. 6.7 
wheat) 
Madhya Pradesh  Price and quantity reduction in 
April 2008 
41.25  52.65  20kg (Rs. 3/kg for wheat and 
Rs. 4.50/kg for rice) 
- 
Orissa  1 July 2008, reduction of issue 
price 
32.98  37.63  25kg/month (Rs. 2/kg rice)  - 
Rajasthan  Price and quantity reduction, 
expanded coverage, 1 May 2010. 
24.85  35.57  25kg (Rs. 2/kg)  35kg (6.50) 
Tamil Nadu  Price reduction 15 September, 
2008; universal since 2006 
48.63  181.9  Max 20 kg rice and wheat: 5-10kg (Rs. 1/kg rice and Rs. 
7.50/kg wheat) 
Notes: Central Issue prices are APL Rice Rs. 8.30; Wheat Rs. 6.10 BPL Rice Rs. 5.65; Wheat 4.15.   
Sources: Number of BPL cards from the Monthly Foodgrain Bulletin (as on 30 June 2009).  PDS Entitlements data from state government websites. Andhra Pradesh: 
http://www.aponline.gov.in/quick%20links/departments/consumer%20affairs%20food%20&%20civil%20supplies/a%20p%20state%20civil%20supplies%20corporation/abo
ut/index_old.html#file2; Chhattisgarh: http://cg.nic.in/khadya/documents/CM%20Khadya.pdf; Himachal: http://admis.hp.nic.in/ehimapurti/function.htm; Karnataka: 
http://des.kar.nic.in/ecsurveynew/chapter5_eng.pdf (2008-9) and http://www.kfcsc.com/pds.htm; Kerala: http://www.civilsupplieskerala.gov.in/PDS_details.aspx;  Orissa: 
http://www.orissa.gov.in/foodsupplies/index.htm; Tamil Nadu: See also http://www.tn.gov.in/policynotes/pdf/food.pdf; Data on starting date of state-level initiative are from 
The Hindu (2005), The Hindu (2007), The Hindu (2010), Mohan (2008), Thai Indian News (2008), Sify News (2008), Economic Times (2006) 
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